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    What I have in mind in this essay is a brief critique of phenomenological 
criticism. It strikes me phenomenology is one of the principal theoretical models for 
inquiries into bodily representation, and it tends to be used informally in a wide 
range of disciplines. (I should say that the strict doctrine of phenomenology is still 
pursued in various parts of the world; in my experience it is particularly strong in 
America, England, France, China, and Japan. Some places are still just discovering 
Merleau-Ponty: the Academy in Hangzhou, for example, is planning translations of 
Merleau-Ponty and Jean Clair. In America, there is a movement called "post-phe-
nomenology," which is comprised mostly of phenomenologists.) 
     Here I am not interested in strict philosophy as much as in interpretive prac-
tices in medicine, history, art history, and art criticism which are loosely and infor-
mally based on Merleau-Ponty. In art history, as in several of the disciplines we've 
heard from in this conference, phenomenology is not only the best available 
account of sense-transcriptions, it is effectively the only one. Some art historians 
have read turn-of-the-century German authors such as Theodor Lipps and Robert 
Vischer, but most would invoke Merleau-Ponty. Behind his work there is existen-
tialism, Sartre, and finally Husserl. Each of them has been named in recent 
accounts. 
     Most of the time, however, scholars don't invoke any philosophers. In 
America several of the most influential art historians are "secretly" disciples of 
Merleau-Ponty-which is to say they follow his ideas, but they don't always cite him. 
A number of scholars write a kind of art history and criticism that depends on tak-
ing note of the historian's own bodily reactions in front of artworks. That kind of 
writing is also loosely phenomenological, and it is the kind of writing I want to 
address today. 
     First it's necessary to say that there is good reason for the historians not to 
cite Merleau-Ponty, because he seldom provides much support for the kinds of writ-
ing that the historians prefer. Certainly any attempt to invoke Merleau-Ponty as a 
theoretical source would have to account for the strong mismatch between his 
vocabulary (which involves words like "sensation," "horizon," "body," "head,"
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"interior," "exterior," and "perspective") and the interests of nearly any art historical 
analysis (which depends on exact questions about the positions, shapes, textures, 
and colors of wrists, fingers, eyes, and other rather body parts). The same observa-
tion could be made about current cultural theory: Judith Butler's work, for exam-
ple, is disembodied and abstract in this sense. In other words, I think the theory of 
phenomenology can't support what's actually happening in art historical practice. 
      By itself, the disparity between what Merleau-Ponty says and what art his-
torians do is not significant. It is really only an instance of the common habit of cit-
ing the nearest available theory in order to get on with some more-or-less unrelated 
and presumably more interesting practice. But the second-hand reliance on phe-
nomenology still concerns me, because it seems to support the idea that all phe-
nomena relevant to a picture are potentially available to an introspective analysis. 
     Two concepts can show the kind of problem I have in mind: the unrepre-
sentable and the inconceivable. 
     In the study of images of the body, a central question concerns what is repre-
sentable. If the representable is whatever can be displayed in any given context, then 
the unrepresentable is whatever cannot be put into an image because it has no pic-
torial equivalent. 
     Medical illustration, and paintings of the body, are particularly interesting 
places to look for signs of the unrepresentable, because they omit so much of their 
subjects. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Western medical images have 
become increasingly specialized, so they omit large parts of the body, simplifying or 
omitting all irrelevant organs and tissues, as well as irrelevant colors, motions, nar-
ratives, physiognomics, and symbolism. 
    A ready example of the large part played by the unrepresentable is the history 
of skin textures, before and after the advent of photography. In many cases it 
required photography to give doctors a sense of what had been unrepresentable in 
terms of the pictorial conventions of color lithography and engraving. Before pho-
tography, even the most vigilant medical illustrations had a property I like to call 
glossing, in which the artist's eye, and the lithographic crayon, slid over the surface 
of the patient's body without stopping to record the outlandish textures of patholo-
gies such as mercury poisoning, syphilis, or neurofibromatosis. 
     In earlier medical illustration, the doctor's eye glossed the skin as a reader 
might gloss a page, missing the everyday texture. After photography, medical illus-
trators and doctors were forced to confront many textures and conditions that were 
previous left unrepresented. The unrepresentable is well known to medical students 
and specialists in computer-assisted medical imaging, because they constantly deal 
with forms, colors, and textures that cannot be captured in whatever technology 
                            262
The Limits of Phenomenology
they are using -I'll come back to this toward the end. The history of medicine 
and the history of art lag a little behind medical practice in this regard, especially 
when they concentrate only on what is present in an image. 
     In addition to the unrepresentable there is another non-phenomonological 
concept I find very useful. It is more elusive and even less studied. The inconceiv-
able is whatever is absent from imagined bodies, and therefore fails even to present 
itself as a technical or conceptual lack in an image. 
      Take the example of Moses's face. What did he look like? Those of you who 
have read the second book of the Bible know there are no illustrations, and you 
may also recall there are no descriptions of Moses aside from one mention of his 
hair and his "shining" face. 
    Yet if a Westerner imagines Moses, he or she will almost surely think of the 
actor Charlton Heston, who played Moses in a famous film. I'm fairly sure Moses 
didn't look like Charlton Heston, and I know from reading Exodus and Numbers 
that the best idea of Moses's face would be to have no idea at all, if that were possi-
ble-if it were possible to read the story of Exodus without thinking of a face at all. 
In terms of the text, his face is unconceived, and even (so I would argue) inconceiv-
able; and in addition it is unrepresented and unrepresentable. 
      There are more intricate examples, but I only want to say enough here to 
introduce the distinction between the unrepresentable and the inconceivable. On 
the one hand, there is the unrepresentable: whatever is taken to be properly not an 
attribute of the visualized body, so that it is excluded from representation, slurred, 
glossed, or otherwise inadequately or partially shown. On the other hand, there is 
the inconceivable: whatever can be described as a conceptual absence, a gap or lack 
in the concept of the representable itself. 
      The two concepts are especially helpful when it comes to images that do 
not fit the canons and conceptions of the figure in the Western history of art. 
Images such as: the uncatalogued kinds of abbreviated figures in rock art and 
neolithic artifacts, the glyphs in Mayan writing, the anthropomorphic forms from 
Chinese Shang dynasty vessels and the early oracle bone script, are all example of 
represented bodies that depend heavily on forms that were taken to be unrepre-
sentable, or were more deeply inconceivable. It isn't enough, looking at such fig-
ures, to speak about the departures from Western realism and perspective as phe-
nomenologists do. Those departures seem like they're fundamentally at odds with 
Western canons of naturalism, and therefore they seem like they're properly the con-
cern of phenomenology: but actually the odd features of such pictures are neither 
departures from Western norms, nor transcriptions of bodily experiences. They 
depend, at a basic level, on what they omit.
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     In a moment I will go on to the examples I've chosen for this essay, skin 
metaphors in Western art and medical illustration. But before I do that, I want to 
spend just a few minutes describing a possible non-phenomenological ground for 
the theory of the unrepresentable and the inconceivable. 
     A very useful starting-point, I've found, is the difference between two 
Platonic conceptions of truth, which both occur in the Republic. In the first, truth 
is something that is "disclosed," and in the second it is "negotiated." Both are dis-
cussed in Heidegger's reading of Plato's Republic, and in subsequent accounts by 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jacques Derrida. Aletheia, in my reading, presents 
the best opportunity to speak of the concept of the inconceivable, and homoiosis, or 
adequation, is the place where the unrepresentable negotiates with the repre-
sentable, revealing partial or working truths. 
     The disclosure or "unconcealment" (aletheia), the fundamental figure for the 
appearance of truth in book 5 of the Republic, changes when Plato begins to speak 
of "aedequation" (homoiosis) to truth in book 10. In Lacoue-Labarthe's terms, in 
book 7 "Plato no longer understands the essence and meaning of aletheia... but 
instead begins to interpret it in terms of homoiosis, adequation." For Heidegger and 
Lacoue-Labarthe, that shift in meaning be taken as the exemplary drama in which 
the two forms of truth we still inherit first became visible. 
     There are many ways to translate the difference between aletheia and 
homoiosis into modern discourses. I could say, for example, that aletheia implies 
truth is found in a correspondence with the world, and homoisosis in coherence 
among accounts: in that case, Plato's two usages would become the "correspon-
dence" and "coherence" theories of truth. In an unpublished seminar, Foucault 
makes a comparable distinction between an "analytics of truth," "concerned with 
determining how to ensure that a statement is true," and a "critical" tradition, con-
cerned with "knowing who is able to tell the truth" and why the truth should be 
told. And there is also the question of representation in psychoanalysis, where the 
inconceivable unconscious idea may be represented to consciousness by a symptom or 
other sign. I do not mean to make strict parallels in any of these cases-I am only 
pointing out the extremely wide possibilities of the fundamental construction of 
aletheia and homoiosis, and suggesting that Foucauldian or Freudian discourse 
might not be the only ways of opening these questions. 
      According to Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger did not quite succeed in keeping 
homoiosis "secondary or derived" in relation to aletheia, opening the way to what 
Derrida calls "an inadequation or an instability belonging to homoiosis." The 
recent readings-Derrida on Lacoue-Labarthe on Heidegger-have become increasing-
ly subtle, and Lacoue-Labarthe attempts to initiate a new kind of experience of 
truth motivated by a "play" with the return of homoiosis. One of Derrida's central
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comments is that Lacoue-Labarthe may not be able to control that play, and that 
aletheia may perpetually dissolve into homoiosis-so that their relation may not be 
susceptible to such a managed rearrangement. 
     This is a fascinating subject, and it couldn't be more important for the histo-
ry of Western philosophy. Here I only want to remark that it is also a good place to 
start when it's a matter of thinking about what cannot find a place in images. Truth 
understood as aletheia perpetually discloses what was inconceivable, and truth as 
homoiosis may be said to concern itself principally with what can be represented. 
Phenomenologically, of course, truth isn't in question-it has to be adequate and 
unveiled-because phenomenology is an attempt to short-circuit the notion of expe-
rience beyond phenomena. 
      With that I want to turn to my subject, skin and membrane matephors: 
beginning with what Heinrich Wolfflin called the "Latin Renaissance." 
     When historians want to explain the relative absence of Renaissance interest 
in skin folds, dimples, softness, hardness, hairs, pores, veins, and the entire cata-
logue of visual forms specific to skin, they usually point to the Renaissance emula-
tion of Greco-Roman sculpture. The unpainted statues and reliefs, it is said, corre-
sponded to Christian thoughts of the ideal bodies and skins that would be donned 
in heaven, so that marmoreal textures were natural candidates for expressing the 
new amalgam of Catholic doctrine and recovered antiquity. 
    Art historical interpretations tend to stall after they mention the classical and 
Judaeo-Christian traditions, and I'd like to propose that the concepts I have been 
developing can help broach the impasse. The fact that more can be said is evident, 
for example, from the different ways Renaissance artists negotiated that ideal. 
    Skin surfaces in Michelangelo's paintings (for instance in the Doni tondo) 
strenuously deny the palpable texture of skin or the difference between skin and 
smoothened rock or finely stitched fabric; but in Raphael skin is not so much 
denied as refigured in terms of very fine, even brushmarks that make the skin look 
like a closely combed or petted surface-a soft, warm, inviting animal surface, a kind 
of pelt, rather than anything strictly human. 
     Bronzino, famous for representing skin in terms of cold stone, actually does 
something more complex: his surfaces are both slick and frozen, like aspic or thick-
ened animal glue spread on stone. A close look at his most labored figures reveals 
that when he has the time, or the interest, his way of avoiding skin takes him fur-
ther from metaphors of marble or ice and closer to oil glaze, tacky resin, shellack or 
lacquer-the skin is not so much petrified as embalmed, encased in a brittle or vis-
cous "second skin" (sometimes evoking, I think intentionally, the "divine garment" 
of the second coming).
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     In cases like this it is not sufficient to speak of marble or to say that the idea 
of skin is elided in representation: skin is inconceivable: it does not present itself as 
part of the pictured body; but it is also represented, as a metaphor for something else 
in the image. 
      Much the same kind of argument can be urged in relation to post-
Renaissance images. Nicolas Jenty's Demonstratio uteri (1761) is an interesting 
case: it's a thin elephant folio of dissections of a woman who died just before she 
came to term. If engraving is the ideal medium for linear exposition of geometry 
and architecture, the mezzotint may be best for the smoky darkness of the inside of 
the body. Apparently the artist, Jan Van Rymsdyk, had little affinity with skin, since 
Jenty's first plate, showing the undissected corpse, is a little clumsy, as if he couldn't 
cope with an expanse of flesh without the detail of the body's inside. In later plates 
the forms shine softly against the rockered dark background. As the body is dissect-
ed the tissues glisten and gleam, still wet and translucent from the fresh cutting. 
     To Van Rymsdyk, as to many who have been seduced by viscera, the uncut 
skin is an enigma. It is unrepresentable, and perhaps also inconceivable: it is not 
part of the body as Jenty or Van Rymsdyk imagine it. But with membranes they are 
in their element, and perhaps also close to necrophilia. 
    For a great deal of medical illustration the conceivable body is a bag of tissues 
and organs, and what is unrepresentable is its normal outsides. This is not the per-
fect negative of the tendencies I sketched in the Italian Renaissance examples: there 
gross anatomy was presupposed but not represented, and here the viscera and their 
membranes are the representable body: in both cases the skin is inconceivable. 
      The tradition I have been sketching here is one in which skin is unrepre-
sentable and sometimes even inconceivable. Membranes become the focus of atten-
tion, and they become rich in metaphorical values. What is normally unrepre-
sentable in fine art, the body's inner membranes, becomes the only representable 
form, and skin is irrelevant, unrepresented, or unrepresentable. 
    This tradition includes some of the seminal works of Western medical illus-
tration, and so it is no surprise to see it again in the current development of medical 
imaging. It has only been in the last few years that imaging software has reached the 
point where skin or membranes can be persuasively depicted. For the most part, 
skin it still unrepresentable, and the body in these images is comprised of organs 
and bulk masses rather than boundaries between insides and outsides. 
      This ispart of a much larger and more complicated history, and I don't 
want to imply that it can be told using un-historical philosophic terms like the 
inconceivable. Like any other critical terms, these need to be used carefully, in the 
analysis of individual images. Then, I think, they can show their value as ways to
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get around current interpretive customs. All too often, people in my field assume 
that if they pay attention to their own body's response to an image, they can gain 
access to meanings that are foreclosed to those who look only for signs of naural-
ism, Euclidean space, and perspective. These concepts, I hope, suggest otherwise. 
     To me, the most interesting parts of pictures are the absences. When I 
encounter a new kind of image, something I've never seen before, I find myself 
wondering about what it omits: how and why it fails to provide the objects it sets 
out to represent. The wonderful thing about representation is that it always breaks 
down, and the wonderful thing about pictures of the body is that they break down 
so quickly, and fail to see so much.
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